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  iiABSTRACT: 
 
The paper is an updated first performance evaluation study of the Polish pension funds 
operating from 1999. The unconditional performance evaluation models are used. It is 
shown that pension fund managers did produce additional value due to active management. 
Therefore, unsatisfactory overall results for the public pension system cannot be attributed 
to the inefficiency of the investment process. The research presents some facts on pension 
funds’ investment behaviour (successful diversification, returns clustering around median 
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  iiiI. INTRODUCTION 
Funded pension schemes are becoming a key point for modern economics and 
economic policy. Increasing demographic pressure combined with the need of 
reforming the existing ineffective and politically vulnerable systems bring about the 
current trends to privatise the modern welfare state and to use capital 
market-based solutions in the old-age provision. 
The urge for reform is particularly strong within the industrialised countries. 
Poland is one of the first countries in Europe to have adopted a public, fully funded 
second old-age security pillar. The heart of the system consists of privately managed 
yet publicly owned pension funds that are the investment vehicles for retirement 
savings. 
There is growing literature on performance evaluation of pension funds. 
However, not much research has been done into performance evaluation of 
mandatory public funds. This paper is an updated version of Stanko (2002) and, (up 
to the author’s best knowledge, the first performance evaluation study of abnormal 
returns (alphas) of the Polish pension funds. The study is motivated by the need of 
analysing the investment efficiency of funds operating in different from UK or US 
institutional and legal framework. Also, findings of this paper help in answering the 
important question on which part of the system (financial institutions or system’s 
design) is responsible for its relatively low system’s efficiency. These issues, crucial 
for the European countries that have introduced the new pension system or intend 
to do so are elaborated in Stanko (2003). 
We are particularly interested in the following three questions: 
How did the results of the funds compare to other investment opportunities in 




Did the active management of the pension funds produce any value added? 
This question helps to analyse the new pension system from the overall design 
framework. 
What can be said about the funds’ investment activity (diversification, asset 
allocation, asset selection and timing)? 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The second section sketches the Polish 
pension reform and describes current pension market. Next, some previous studies 
on pension funds are discussed. Section IV presents information on the data used. 
Section V compares funds’ recent results with other investment opportunities. 
Composite performance measures are calculated in section VI. Section VII 
introduces performance evaluation models used in the paper. Section VIII discusses 
the empirical findings. The last section concludes. 
 
  1II. BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE POLISH PENSION SYSTEM 
The Polish new retirement system1 started in April 1999. Currently there are 
16 pension funds2  run by private managing companies. They administer individual 
accounts for each insured and invest their savings in the capital market. The 
retirement age is set at 60 for women and 65 for men. Before reaching that age, the 
insured cannot withdraw their retirement assets. However, in case of death of the 
insured, the assets are subject to inheritance law. 
Current assets of the pension funds system (end of March 2003) comprise of 
approx. 8.4 b USD with 11.23 m individual accounts. The market is of an oligopoly 
type – the first four funds have almost 75% of assets. The law roughly predefines 
the investment style as investment limits permit to hold maximum of 55% of 
portfolio in stock. 
There exists a wide range of regulations concerning safety measures (reporting, 
guarantee and reserve funds, fund as a legal entity separated from managing 
company), minimal guaranteed rate of return, evaluation framework and similar. 
This paper deals only with performance evaluation of pension funds. The overall 
economic efficiency of the second pillar (costs and performance monitoring issues) is 
discussed in Stanko (2003). 
 
III. PREVIOUS STUDIES 
Up to the author’s best knowledge, so far there has been no research into Polish 
pension funds that uses finance theory to evaluate abnormal returns (alphas). The 
supervisory body, Committee of Insurance and Pension Fund Supervision) has just 
released (end of May 2003) a report on investment policy of fund administrators 
(KNUiFE, 2003), discussing period of 2000-2002. Some issues of monthly and 
quarterly bulletins by KNUiFE on the results of the pension funds are also 
available. However, these include only calculation of internal rate of return, the 
weighted average rate of return and mandatory minimum rate of return, specified 
by law. 
The pension funds representative body, Chamber of Pensions Fund 
Administrators released last year a short commentary (IGFE, 2002) that presented 
the results of industry in comparison to other investment vehicles.   
Numerous recent international papers discuss the problem of pension funds 
performance and measurement, but these funds differ in their nature and 
                                                   
1  For a more detailed description of the Polish system of public pension funds and a 
discussion of current problems, see Stanko (2003). 
2  The Ego fund has recently (January 2002) terminated its operations as a result of 
merger with the Skarbiec fund. 
  2legislation environment from the public fully funded pension frameworks that were 
introduced in Latin America and recently, in Central and Eastern Europe. The 
Latin American studies do not provide estimates of alphas. Our study attempts to 
bring some insights on how the pension fund work in the European context. 
Blake and Board (2000, p. 552) study the UK private pension funds and find 
that the average fund underperformed the market average by 0.45 percentage 
points per annum, before deducting any fund management fee. Another UK study 
into over 2000 segregated pension funds by Thomas and Tonks (2001, p. 17) during 
the period 1983-1997 found that most of the funds are “close-trackers” to the FT-All 
Share Index and that their average outperformance was significantly different from 
zero, around one half of a percentage point per year. The average selectivity alpha 
and the average timing parameters were both negative (Thomas and Tonks, 2001, p. 
14). Also, Blake et al. (2001, p. 15) present evidences that the funds’ results are very 
close to the benchmark and on average slightly underperform it. Blake et al. (1999) 
found a stock selection negative and the average market timing very negative.   
There are relatively many studies into the American pension funds. Ippolito and 
Turner (1987) studied over 1500 US ERISA-based pension funds during the period 
of 1977-1983, and Lakonishok et al. (1992) examined 769 defined benefit funds in 
1983-1989. Both studies conclude that, on average, the pension managers 
significantly underperformed the passive management style (represented by S&P 
index). Lakonishok et al. (1992) relates the average underperformance of 1.3% 
annually to the agency problems (“window-dressing”). A study of Coggin et al. (1993) 
on a random sample of 71 US equity pension funds during 1983-1990 found a 
significant positive selectivity and negative timing. Christopherson et al. (1998), 
using conditional performance evaluation framework evaluate 261 manager 
portfolios over 1980-1996 to the Russell 3000 benchmark and find that the average 
manager outperforms the Russel by 0.72% per annum. 
 
IV. DATA DESCRIPTION 
A. Source   
  The sample covered in the analysis ranges from the beginning of June 1999 
till the end of March 2003 and is the most comprehensive one. The system started in 
April 1999, but it was not before June 1999 when the majority of the funds launched 
their operations in the market and gathered enough premiums to invest. 
  The closing daily data on pension funds unit prices, stock and bond market 
indices were obtained from the Internet site of the economic journal “Parkiet” 
(www.parkiet.com/dane). The Merrill Lynch Polish Government Index (GOPL) was 
given courtesy of Mr. Phil Galdi from Merrill Lynch. Mr. Janusz Zielinski from the 
National Bank of Poland provided the data on Treasury Bills yields for the 
secondary market. The data concerning Polish mutual funds investing in bonds 
were retrieved from financial pages www.money.pl and www.tfi.hoga.pl. 
  3B. Data description 
We employ continuously compounded monthly rates of return. The assumption 
was that an investment starts in the morning of the first working day of month and 
ends in the morning of the first working day of the following month. Therefore, the 
closing values of the last trading day were used.   
The returns from an investment in the stock market were calculated with the 
use of WIG and WIG20 indices (Warszawski Indeks Giełdowy, Warsaw Stock Index). 
The former represents a total return index that includes dividends and pre-emptive 
rights. The latter consists of 20 blue chips and does not account for dividends3. The 
pension funds are obliged by law to follow investment limits. Therefore, the pension 
managing houses invest heavily in blue chips equity, which are described by WIG20 
index. 
For bond returns, the Merrill Lynch GOPL and MFUND indices were used. The 
former is a proxy of profitability from investing in Polish government bonds and 
reflects accrued interest income. The latter index is the arithmetic average of the 
returns of the biggest three mutual funds investing in bonds and money 
instruments. It serves as another benchmark and reflects in particular the pension 
fund’s strategy of preserving the portfolio’s accumulated value.   
In the case of missing data, an artificial time-weighted data was computed, they 
consist only 1.8% of all input values, though. 
C. Distribution and statistical properties of returns and indexes 
There are 883 monthly returns for 21 pension funds during the 46-month period 
of 1 June 1999 – 31 March 2003. Almost all (88% of all survived funds) of monthly 
returns for the pension funds are normal at 1% significance level. The monthly 
returns for stock and bond markets are normally distributed, while the mutual bond 
market and treasury bills are not. 
As the data revealed heteroskedasticity, White (1980) heteroskedasticity 
-consistent covariance matrix estimators are employed. The investment results for 
pension funds are highly correlated with one another (most of them above 0.85), 
suggesting existence of common return generator factor or factors. 
The augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Peron unit root tests for all fund, 
stock and bond excess returns, as well as for the averages, rejected the hypothesis of 
non-stationarity.  
 
                                                   
3 Income from dividends for the industry in 2002 amounted to nearly 95 m PLN, 
that is, to 6.17% of whole revenues from investments (KNUiFE, Quarterly Bulletin 
4/2002). 
  4V. PERFORMANCE VS ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT VEHICLES 
Table 1 presents the discretely compounded nominal rates of return achieved by 
the pension fund administrators during the period 1 June 1999 - 31 March 2003. 
Nominal rates of return for the survived pension funds (Part C) ranged between 
44% and 66% for the whole period, or 10% and 14% annually. The results of the 
three bank-based funds that appeared on the market later (Part B) are somehow 
lower than the outcomes of those that had started earlier. Their annual rates of 
return are lower than the arithmetic average of the early starters: 12.09%. Also, two 
of the late-starters experienced lower annual rates of return than their competitors. 
All of the funds that ceased their activity (Part A) started their activity late 
(May-September 1999). Interestingly, several of the discontinued funds had quite 
high annual returns. The other fund that disappeared from the market, Rodzina, 
performed very well, however it started its operations as the last one amongst all 21 
pension providers. 
It is logical to assume then that performance was not the only reason for 
mergers or acquisitions that took place in the market. Rather, some funds started 
their marketing campaigns too late. Having failed to achieve an economically sound 
fragment of the market they were forced to quit. Up till now, none of the funds that 
had commenced their activity early have merged or been a subject of a takeover. The 
explanation lies rather in the economies of scale and timing of the marketing 
campaign and the number of initial customers. There seems to be no evidence 
indicating that the changes in the market were caused by choices of the consumers. 
Thus, as long as the inferior investment skills are not the main cause for funds’ 
disappearance from the market, the problem of survivorship bias4 should not have 
any effect on the performance evaluation. 
Table 1 Pension funds. The investment results for the period 1 June 1999 – 31 March 2003. 
Table 2 presents some basic information on survived pension funds. The 
geometric annual real rates of return for the survived funds are quite diverse. The 
best funds earned in real terms around 7-8% p.a. while the worst one achieved a 
mere 2% growth. The funds managing the biggest parts of national pension savings 
have also wealthier-than-average members. These managing companies are 
branches of leading international insurers that had already recognizable trademark 
in Poland and stable clientele from the middle class. For instance, 22% of all 
insured are members of the Commercial Union fund; however this fund administers 
28.5% of all savings. Only for the PZU fund, a national insurer, this relationship is 
opposite.  
                                                   
4 Survivor effect is a problem when the evaluated performance is (usually) biased 
upside “due to exclusive focus on those institutions that survived throughout the 
evaluation period.” (Davis and Steil, 2001). For this topic see for example 
Goetzmann et al. (1992), Elton et al. (1996), Garcia and Gould (1993). 
  5Table 2 Basic facts on Polish pension funds (as of 31 March 2003). 
An inspection of tables 2 and 3 reveals that in the investigated period it was a 
much wiser strategy to follow the bond markets than to invest in the stock market. 
The results of the best pension funds (first quartile equal 6.22% p.a.) were much 
lower than with the Merrill Lynch Polish Government Bonds index (9% p.a.) and 
the three biggest mutual funds investing in bonds and money instruments (7.5%). 
The pension funds present themselves a great deal better in comparison with 
mutual funds, especially those investing in shares (equity, balanced and growth 
funds) and retirement funds (Table 3). Half of all funds won with both of these 
investment vehicles. 
Table 3 Pension funds vs. other investments. The investment results for the period 1 June 
1999 – 31 March 2003. 
Due to constant bear market, the rates of return earned by administrators of 
the pension funds are not much higher than the one earned by following the most 
naïve strategy that is saving monies in the bank account. Five of the funds earned 
even less than the bank account interests. Only the dollar deposits have brought 
negative rate of return.   
Discussing the results one should remember that the funds are supposed to 
follow the prudent rule of diversification and also to operate within the investment 
limits specified by law. Therefore, they could not invest 100% of their assets into one 
asset bearing the highest return at the time (for instance in the bank accounts). The 
asset allocation benchmark that reflects the typical stock-bond combination 
employed by pension funds would have earned around 40-50% at the same period, 
which suggests that funds have actively adjusted their holdings as their average 
returns exceeded 50%. Equally important is the fact that the pension savings did 
not eroded due to inflation. 
 
VI. COMPOSITE PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
Table 4 presents the Sharpe and Treynor ratios5 for pension funds and other 
investment vehicles during the period of 1 June 1999 – 31 June 2003. The 
                                                   
5 The ex-post Sharpe ratio is calculated as: 
2
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, where ri – rf is the differential 
return that is a difference between a return earned by a fund during a period and 
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in other words, the relation between the covariance of fund and market portfolio 
  6calculation period is appropriately reduced in cases when a fund or instrument 
existed for shorter time. The ratios were calculated on the basis of monthly 
continuously compounded returns. 
The ratios are mostly negative since for majority funds their total returns were 
lower than Treasury Bills yield. The absolute values of the Sharpe indicator are 
small because during the period, the Treasury Bills and bond index returns were 
comparable. Even the best results achieved by mutual funds that invested in bond 
and money instruments are still much lower (0.17-0.15) than the historical Sharpe 
ratio for the American stock market of around 0.5. Again, such effect can be 
attributed to the bear market dominating during last three years. 
Table 4 Composite performance measures for pension funds and other investment vehicles. 
Both indicators do not quantify the value added of active portfolio management. 
However, they help in ranking the efficiency of the funds’ investments. The Sharpe 
ratio uses the standard deviation for calculating its total risk of a portfolio. Thus, 
the ratio does not say anything about the diversification issues. Since the 
pensioners cannot split their retirement assets within several funds at the same 
time, this ratio is a useful measure. Since they put their entire premiums in a single 
well-diversified fund, the total risk is important. The Treynor grade is more suitable 
for the portfolios that are already diversified since only the non-diversifiable 
(systematic) part is taken into consideration. 
An important function of the institutional investors is the risk diversification. 
The total risk for a well-diversified portfolio should be identical (in theory) or very 
similar (in practice) to the systematic risk, then. In the case of pension funds, as far 
as they do their diversification job well, both of the rankings should be identical. 
The rankings achieved by Sharpe and Treynor ratios (Table 5) are essentially the 
same and it implies that their portfolios were well diversified. Only four funds have 
slightly different ranks. The correlation ratios between the rankings are high and 
equal to 0.990 (Panel A, all funds) and 0.994 (Panel B, survived funds). 
Table 5 Comparison of ranking persistency. 
 
VII. METHODOLOGY 
This section discusses the methodology for testing whether the pension funds’ 
active management create some additional (compared to passive investing) value 
for the system members. Since the market is very new, the data series are short. 
Moreover, the author does not possess full information concerning the pension 
funds’ portfolio structure (only the general public information was accessible). Some 
of the basic indices still do not exist (for example the dividend index). These facts 
                                                                                                                                                      
returns and the volatility of the market portfolio. 
  7altogether limit severely the usage of possible models of performance evaluation, 
particularly the conditional evaluation framework6. 
A. Unconditional market model   
A basic Jensen’s regression was used. As Cesari and Panetta (2002) remark, the 
Jensen’s alpha can be treated as an unbiased performance measure if the manager 
of portfolio (fund) possesses security-specific information but no timing information. 
When the manager achieves successful timing, the measure is usually biased 
downward (Cesari and Panetta, 2002). The unconditional version of the market 
model is as follows: 
it ft mt im i ft it r r r r ε β α ~ ) ~ ( ~ + − + = −  
where: rit is the return of the ith fund at the period t and rft is the risk-free return 
at the period t, rmt represents the return of the benchmark market portfolio and βim 
is the fund’s beta, that its systematic risk. The tildes denote random variables. The 
returns in this paper include brokerage, service, depository and asset management 
fees. They do not include the up-load payment, though7. 
In the context of available data, the stock market indices (WIG and WIG20) 
were used as proxies for the market portfolio. It is hoped that as the pension market 
grows a new pension-oriented index will be created. This question is beyond the 
scope of the paper and is discussed further in Stanko (2003). 
B. Unconditional two-index model  
The portfolio structure of pension funds is an important issue in their 
performance evaluation. As opposed to the heavily researched mutual funds, the 
pension funds hold also considerable amounts of bonds and other interest-bearing 
instruments. Recently, they invested around 60-70% of assets in bonds and only 
20-30% in stock (Table 6). According to the modern portfolio theory, bonds should be 
                                                   
6 For conditional models based on returns see Ferson and Schadt (1996); models 
employing portfolio holdings are presented in Ferson and Khang, (2002). Daniel et 
al. (1997) introduce characteristic-based benchmarks. Also, there exist numerous 
other methodologies employing: style analysis (Sharpe, 1992) ordered mean 
difference (Bowden, 2000), seemingly unrelated assets (Pastor and Stambaugh, 
2002), stochastic discount factor (Farnsworth et. al, 2002), Bayesian performance 
(Baks et al., 2001) and flows (Guercio and Tkac, 2000). 
7  According to the Polish law, the up-load fees are deducted before contributions are 
calculated into investment units. Investment costs are calculated every working day. 
The fee for management (equal to monthly maximum 0.05% of accumulated assets) 
is calculated alike; however, the deduction takes place on the month’s last working 
day. Therefore, the monthly returns are not affected, as they are calculated on the 
basis of last days of the succeeding months (the consequences of fee payment cancel 
out). 
  8treated as a part of all risky portfolios. Usually (mainly due to data availability and 
frequency), it is the stock market index that represents the risky assets. The value 
of the beta shows the sensitivity of the fund’s return to the return of the stock 
market benchmark. However, the monthly returns from the bond instruments 
(represented by GOPL) are low correlated with stock; merely 0.31 (correlation with 
WIG index) and 0.25 (with WIG20 index). 
Table 6 Investment portfolio of Polish pension funds as of 31 March 2003. 
The risk measure for bond instruments is probably better associated with the 
duration term. Since such data is not directly available, the solutions might be as 
follows. One may try to regress the two-index model and to estimate the parameters. 
Alternatively, as in Elton et al. (1993), one first regresses the bond returns against 
the stock exchange index and then uses such orthogonalized index to measure 
marginal return contribution to the stock index (i.e. the part of the returns that are 
uncorrelated with the main stock index). Blake et al. (2001, p. 15) use the 
multiple-index Jensen regression arguing in other paper that such approach “is 
likely to be more appropriate for the aggregate portfolio” (Blake et al., 1998, p. 5). 
The following two-index model is considered: 
it ft bt im ft mt im i ft it r r r r r r ε θ β α ~ ) ~ ( ) ~ ( ~ + − + − + = −  
where: rit is the return of the ith fund at the period t and rft is the risk-free return 
at the period t, rmt and rbt represents the returns of the benchmark (stock and bond) 
market portfolios and βim, θim are the fund’s betas for stock and bond investments, 
respectively. The tildes denote random variables. 
In the case when funds investments are mainly concentrated on specific 
subgroups of securities the market model and the two-index model might not 
describe properly a fund’s investment strategy. Cesari and Panetta (2002) propose 
the five-factor model estimated by maximum likelihood method. However, in the 
context of Poland most of the investment in stocks is concentrated in blue chips and 
national bonds, therefore two-index model should suffice (Table 6). 
C. Asset allocation benchmark 
A synthetic index At represents the investment returns from strategic asset 
allocation portfolio at time t, employed by a pension fund. The asset allocation 
structure in last three years was approximately 30% of assets invested in stock and 
70% in bond. 
it ft t i i ft it r A r r ε β α ~ )
~
( ~ + − + = −  
  9Blake and Timmermann (2002, p. 110) argue that the strategic asset allocation 
is a risk decision, not the investment one and is usually determined by maturity 
structure of the anticipated liability cash flows. However, one may use the strategic 
asset allocation benchmark to judge the stock selection and market timing (i.e. 
tactical asset allocation) decisions. A comparison of empirical alphas and alphas 
derived from asset allocation portfolio gives some insights for portfolio attribution. 
We employ four benchmarks being a combination of stock (WIG, WIG20) and bond 
(GOPL, MFUNDS) indices. 
D. Unconditional timing models 
If a fund’s performance is based not only on the security-specific information 
possessed by an investment manager but also on his or her timing strategy, then the 
alpha estimates from time series undervalue this timing ability (Cesari and Panetta, 
2002). This is so because the composition, and therefore the risk of the portfolio, 
changes as the managers adjust their exposure to risk in reaction to the market 
trends. The performance measurement must therefore recognize the manager’s 
micro-forecasting ability (security selection) and macro-forecasting ability (market 
timing). 
The paper considered two models to estimate market timing. The first, based on 
Treynor-Mazuy test (1966) assumes a non-linear relationship between the risk and 
return: 
it ft mt i ft mt i i ft it r r TM r r r r ε β α ~ ) ~ ( ) ~ (
~ ~ 2 + − + − + = −  
The intercept alpha estimate measures the security selection ability, while the 
squared term represents the additional amount of return as a product of the timing 
ability. When the TM parameter is positive, this ability is superior, while negative 
value shows that the fund is losing the shareholders’ money by engaging in 
speculative activity. 
To derive the equation above, one needs to start with the standard Jensen model 
and then assume that changes of beta are only due to the market timing activity: 
) ~ (
~ ~ ) ~ ( ~
ft mt i i it ft mt i i ft it r r TM and r r r r − + = + − + = − β β ε β α  
Merton (1981), and Henriksson and Merton (1981) define the market-timing 
ability as the skill of predicting whether the excess return on risky assets will be 
positive or negative, i.e. whether the return on risky assets will be higher than the 
risk-free rate at a particular period (Jagannathan and Korajczyk, 1986, p.220). If 
such a situation is predicted, then the manager weights his or her portfolio more 
heavily towards the risky instruments and the new beta of portfolio increases. 
Therefore, the Merton-Henriksson model assumes the following relation: 
  10it ft mt i ft mt i i ft it r r TM r r r r ε β α ~ )] ~ ( , 0 max[ ) ~ ( ~ + − − + − + = −  
 
VIII. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
A. Alphas   
Table 7 presents the results of the OLS regression for the unconditional market 
and two-index models. An arithmetic average of all fund’s returns was used to 
represent the industry’s results. Panel A shows the Jensen’s alphas for all 13 funds 
that operated on the market within last four years. The estimates for various 
models range between 3 and 4.3 per cent per annum. All alphas are significant at 
5%. The funds’ active management has created an additional value comparing to the 
results that would have been obtained by a passive investment in stock and bond 
indices8. 
Table 7 Pension industry performance: Jensen’s alpha (annualized monthly returns). 
Panel B shows the outcomes for a wider sample of survived funds (16). The 
group incorporates three funds that started their activity later. The number of 
monthly observations is shorter (42 instead of 46) and that is probably the reason 
(along with lower investment efficiency itself) why the estimates are slightly less 
significant. The estimated alphas are around 2.7 – 3.9 per cents and are lower than 
that in Panel A. It may suggest that the investment efficiency of the latecomers was 
lower. 
Panel C demonstrates results for a variable number of funds present at the 
market during the whole period of 46 months. Their alphas are significant and are a 
little lower than the first group (Panel A) but higher than the second group (Panel 
B). The values vary between 3 and 4.1% per annum. It implies that the latecomers 
and the discontinued funds had altogether somehow lower results. Due to short 
series of observations, the estimates for the survived latecomers and for the 
discontinued funds alone are not significant and are not presented here. 
Few of the models revealed autocorrelation; therefore autoregression AR error 
models were used. For instance, a first-order serial correlation of error term would 
result in the following model: 
it ft bt im ft mt im i ft it r r r r r r ε θ β α ~ ) ~ ( ) ~ ( ~ + − + − + = −  
where 
                                                   
8  However, these are the alphas that do not take into account the possible higher 
costs and fees that one must pay for such a superior investment service: “In this 
case, we can expect to observe abnormal performance only by examining gross 
returns, which do not have transaction costs, fees, or other expenses subtracted 
from them.” (Grinblatt and Titman, 1989, p. 393).   
  11it it it v ~ ~
1 + = − ρε ε  and    ) N(0, ~ ~ 2
it it σ v  
Once the general boundaries for the alpha values have been drawn, it is 
interesting to analyse how the funds were performing on the individual basis. This 
information is presented in Table 8. Depending on the monthly model, there are 
around 10-12 significant alphas at the 10 % significance level in the case of market 
models and 7 in the case of two-index market models. The two-index models in 
general bring lower (0.5-1%) alphas than the market model. Practically all 
significant estimates are only in the group with the longest history (i.e. the early 
started survived funds). Slightly less than half of these funds reveal significant 
alphas. 
Two-index models using the government bonds yields (GOPL) and the models 
with the MFUNDS index give the same 6 significant results. However, the returns 
from investing in blue chips (WIG20) should be underestimated and the 
performance overestimated9. However, the empirical results do not vary much. For 
most of significant alphas the WIG20 index used in place of WIG produces only 
slightly higher (0.02-0.4%) estimates of alphas. The probable explanation is that 
high-capitalized WIG20 drives the whole market index and is more volatile then the 
entire market. The funds invest mainly in blue chips. During the last four years, the 
WIG20 experienced more negative return than WIG (see Table 3). That is perhaps 
why that effect offset the dividend upshot. 
Table 8 Individual pension funds performance: estimates of Jensen’s alpha. 
Next table presents the individual funds alphas and the industry average. As 
discussed, the group of two-index models seems to better represent investment 
portfolios of Polish funds. The estimates are 0.5-1% lower than in the case of 
single-factor market models. The “added-value” product of the active pension 
management in Poland can be assessed on average as 2.7-2.8 % per annum for the 
industry as a whole and 3.0-3.5 % for the early-starters. The best fund (Nationale 
Nederlanden) achieved alphas at the level of 6.0%, with the other funds at the level 
of 3-4% that is 0.5-1% better results than the average. 
A direct comparison between funds is not possible because the portfolios have 
various levels of systematic risk (betas). A higher alpha usually means that the 
manager took more unsystematic risk by using private selection information to 
invest more in particular shares. Interestingly, there is quite strong relation for top 
funds between estimated alphas and the funds’ positions in the total real return (see 
also Table 1) and Sharpe ratio rankings (Table 4). There is no strong connection 
between the investment results (alphas or raw returns) and size of the funds 
(market share). 
Table 9 Pension funds with significant alphas. 
                                                   
9  Alpha is a result not explained by the model. Investing in market portfolio should 
produce capital gains and dividend income. The later part is not accounted for by 
the index. Therefore the dividends artificially increase the value of alpha. 
  12Following the methodology of Blake et al. (2001, p. 10-14), the annualised 
interquartile range in each of the models was calculated for raw annual 
continuously compounded returns and alphas. The interquartile range shows the 
difference between top 75% and 25% results. In the case of all survived funds, these 
ranges are practically identical: 150.8 basis points for raw returns and 152.2 for 
alphas arriving from GOPL-WIG20 model. However, if just the early starters are 
taken into account 10 , the variability between return and abnormal return 
distributions increases. The interquartile range for raw returns is 61.5 basis points, 
with range for alpha of 76.9 annualised basis points. These results suggest that: 1) 
the fund industry returns (particularly the early starters) had tendency to cluster 
around the median value, and 2) the Jensen unconditional models managed to 
detect a portion of performance variability. 
B. Asset allocation 
Table 10 presents information about alphas from the asset allocation models for 
monthly returns. The alpha from the asset allocation benchmark shows results of 
the pension administrators’ decision concerning the long-run risk profile of the 
managed portfolio. 
Table 10 Abnormal returns from asset allocation and two-index models – comparison. 
The alphas calculated on the basis of the 0.3WIG/0.7GOPL asset allocation 
model are approximately 0.5% lower than the ones derived from the two-index 
model. This may suggest that the asset allocation benchmark is more efficient and 
better represents long-run pension investment strategy. 
There is another interesting fact (not presented in the table). For GOPL-based 
models, the asset allocation alphas are lower than the alphas from two-index 
models. The situation is opposite when MFUNDS is used. Besides stock and bonds, 
a pension fund maintains also cash and money-market instruments. The MFUNDS 
index does account for this part of holdings while the GOPL does not. That is 
probably why, under the bear market, the alphas from asset allocations for 
MFUNDS are higher. 
The abnormal returns from asset allocation portfolios represent over 80% of 
total abnormal returns for individual funds and over 70% for the averages. 
C. Timing 
Timing models with monthly returns bring a few significant estimates (Table 
11). In most some cases, to handle the autocorrelation, the autoregressive error 
term models were used. Apart from one, all the listed funds have positive significant 
estimates of the timing factor. It supports the observed facts: pension funds 
switched from stock assets towards bonds in order to defend against the bear 
                                                   
10 None of the models gave significant alpha estimates for the survived latecomers. 
Thus, the estimation of interquartile range is higher if one skips those three funds. 
  13market. A comparison of timing estimates sheds some light on the relative 
importance of timing strategy for each fund in its investment policy. Unfortunately, 
nothing can be directly inferred about their security selection skills, for with one 
exception, all the alphas are insignificant. Only the Pioneer fund reveals a negative 
timing skill and a positive selection capacity (alpha positive at 5% level and equal to 
0.11). 
Nevertheless, bringing together the information on timing and asset selection 
gives us some indirect idea about stock selection. Abnormal returns for GOPL-based 
asset allocation models are lower than total abnormal return, while the MFUNDS 
asset allocation alphas follow the opposite. Knowing that timing was positive for all 
of the above models induces a suggestion that security selection capability was 
negative. Such conclusions are weak, though, as are based on too few significant 
timing estimates. 
Table 11 Timing models. 
D. Size effect and performance 
Regression of funds’ returns on their final magnitudes did not produce any 
significant relationship. The average nominal rate of return for all the funds 
(12.09% p.a.) is lower than the average weighted by market share at the end of the 
period11 (12.69%), which would imply that bigger funds had better returns in 
general than the small funds. One of the possible conjectures why the size effect is 
not caught in more evident form is that the time horizon is too short and the big 
funds have not yet: (a) achieved the critical magnitudes (organizational problems); 
(b) dominated the stock markets (impact of trading size on market). 
E. Polish results in comparison to other studies 
While comparing to the international results, the Polish pension industry 
recorded high economically and statistically significant abnormal results. There 
might be several reasons for being so. Firstly, the market during last four years was 
definitely bearish; therefore the low-risk strategy (loading off the idiosyncratic stock 
risk and investing more in government instruments with high real yield) relatively 
easy bitten up the indexes. Funds also had longer investment horizon than the 
individuals who do not possess much information and who are more prone to panic 
during market corrections. This issue is somehow supported by positive timing 
abilities revealed. The second likely explanation is that the market indices used 
were not efficient. It is particularly probable since the Polish capital market is 
definitely still far from being semi-efficient and its size and depth are limited. 
Particularly, recent developments have brought concerns of market saturation with 
pension fund investments. Finally, there might be other types of information that 
were not accounted for by the model used here. 
                                                   
11 One should weight the returns by the value of the fund at the end of each period 
(for instance a quarter). However, since there was no considerable change in the 
market structure within this period for the survived pensions, even such a rough 
calculation should work well. 
  14IX. CONCLUSIONS 
The gross investment results for the pension fund market are satisfactory. The 
market as a whole and half of the existing sample produced significantly positive 
results. Funds that started earlier experienced higher abnormal returns. The 
industry asset management results could be perhaps even better if some of the 
system-built problems were limited. The unsatisfactory net return for pension 
funds’ members must be ascribed to the overall regulatory and organizational flaws 
affecting the pension framework (Stanko, 2003). 
Positive alphas were achieved due to asset allocation and market timing. With 
respect to the performance attribution, asset allocation played a dominant role. 
Security selection during that time produced negative results (bear market), 
however one could question its relative importance. It is because most of the 
investments were located in blue chips partly in response to the investment law, 
partly due to herding around mode manager (effect of mandatory minimum rate of 
return). Moreover, the proof is indirect and weak that is the data is not long enough 
to obtain more statistically significant timing estimates. 
The funds applied active trading techniques (positive timing) and accomplished 
diversification jobs. No relation between the size and performance was observed, 
probably due to the market’s immaturity. 
However, the annualised interquartile range in raw returns and in estimated 
alphas shows the industry’s tendency to gather around the median fund manager. 
These findings are in line with a UK study by Davis et al. (2001) who attribute the 
effect in to: the predominance of a single investment style, the fee structures and 
performance evaluation incentives. In the Polish context, these issues are discussed 
in Stanko (2003). 
One of the study’s limitations is that it did not employ the conditional performance 
evaluation models due to lack of proper equivalents for the Fama-French (1993) 
multi-factor models and proxies for information variables. Also, the number of 
observations is still very small. One of the interesting questions is whether the funds 
follow the contrarian strategy. The next issue is to analyze the portfolio holdings of the 
funds and try to use this data within the weight conditional performance evaluation 
framework as well as to perform the Grinblatt and Titman F-test for performance 
measures. These issues are intended to be addressed in the future. 
  15Tables 
Table 1 Polish pension funds: nominal investment results for the period 1 June 1999 – 
31 March 2003. Discrete rates of return (%). 
睨潬攠 物潤 瀮 睨 攠灥 潤 愮
䅒 ㄳ 㠹 †† †† ㌵ † †† †† ⸴ 㠠 †† † 㤮 ㄸ †† †† †
㘲 †† †† † ㌶ † †† †† ⸷ 㤠 †† † ㄰ ㌰ †† ††
偉 ㌲ ㈵ †† †† ㄴ⸳ † †† † ⸱ ㈠ †† † ㄱ ㌶ †† ††
䥎 㐳 㔱 †† †† ㄸ⸱ † †† † ⸵ 㘠 †† † ㄲ ㈹ †† ††
㔳 㘰 †† †† ㄲ⸷ † †† † ⸲ 㐠 †† † ㄳ 〶 †† ††
䅌 䅎 㔱 㤷 †† †† ㄲ⸳ † †† † ⸷ 㜠 †† † ㄰ 㠸 †† ††
㌴ 㠳 †† †† 㤱 † †† †† ⸵ 㐠 †† † ㄱ 㔴 †† ††
偅 㐵 㘷 †† †† ㄰⸸ † †† † ⸵ ㄠ †† † ㄱ ㄸ †† ††
䅉 㐴 〹 †† †† ㄰⸰ † †† † ⸸ 㜠 †† † ㄲ ㈸ †† ††
之 佗 㔳 ㌵ †† †† ㄱ⸸ † †† † ⸰ ㌠ †† † ㄲ ㄲ †† ††
䍕 㔶 㤹 †† †† ㄲ⸴ † †† † ⸷ 〠 †† † ㄲ 〵 †† ††
㔵 ㄳ †† †† ㄲ⸱ † †† † ⸸ 㜠 †† † ㄲ 〹 †† ††
乎 㘶 〷 †† †† ㄴ⸱ † †† † ⸸ 㜠 †† † ㄱ 㤰 †† ††
偂 㔵 㔰 †† †† ㄲ⸲ † †† † ⸸ ㌠ †† † ㄲ 〸 †† ††
偏 䍚 㐵 㘵 †† †† ㄰⸳ † †† † ⸷ ㌠ †† † ㄲ ㈵ †† ††
偏 㘱 ㈷ †† †† ㄳ⸲ † †† † ⸳ ㄠ †† † ㄱ 㤸 †† ††
做 㔵 㤵 †† †† ㄲ⸲ † †† † ⸷ 㤠 †† † ㄲ 〷 †† ††
䵐 乕 㘴 㐵 †† †† ㄳ⸸ † †† † ⸰ ㈠ †† † ㄱ 㤳 †† ††
䅒 㐶 㜶 †† †† ㄰⸵ † †† † ⸶ ㌠ †† † ㄲ ㈳ †† ††
坉乔 㔳 㐴 †† †† ㄱ⸸ † †† † ⸰ ㈠ †† † ㄲ ㄲ †† ††
䍈 㔵 㠸 †† †† ㄲ⸲ † †† † ⸸ 㤠 †† † ㄲ 〹 †† ††
䈮⁆ 湤 慴⁳瑡 瑥搠瑨 爠 瑩癩⁡瑥爠⁊畮 ‱㤹
䌮⁆ 湤猠瑨 慴⁳瑡牴敤 ⁴桥 慣瑩癩瑹 ⁢ 景牥ㄠ䩵湥 ㄹ
乯 湡氠牥 牮 ⁡ 敲慧攪
⁄ 湵敤
 
Calculation period: 1 June 1999 – 31 March 2002. Discretely compounded nominal rates of 
return. Annual returns are geometric rates of return. For funds with shorter period of 
activity the calculation period is appropriately adjusted. Market average indicates the 
arithmetic average of returns achieved by the competitors. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
  16Table 2 Basic facts on Polish pension funds (as of 31 March 2003). 












Late-starters:           
ALLIANZ  5.46  239 261  2.1  905.4  2.7 
KREDYT BANK  2.22  152 494  1.4  221.6  0.7 
PEKAO  4.30  294 922  2.6  555.2  1.7 
Early starters:           
AIG  4.01  877 114  7.8  2 861.8  8.5 
BANKOWY  5.71  389 150  3.5  1 022.7  3.0 
CU (Commercial 
Union) 
6.36  2 535 855  22.6  9 557.3  28.5 
DOM  6.03  246 593  2.2  573.9  1.7 
NN (Nationale 
Nederlanden) 




6.09  381 724  3.4  627.9  1.9 
POCZTYLION  4.30  454 365  4.0  697.9  2.1 
POLSAT  7.11  127 296  1.1  135.2  0.4 
PZU  6.17  1 822 713  16.2  4 718.1  14.1 
SAMPO  7.65  450 113  4.0  972.6  2.9 




5.73  345 754  3.1  810.5  2.4 
ZURICH  6.16  377 196  3.4  1 107.7  3.3 
   
* as of 28 March 2003. Real returns in %. Distribution of real rates of return: first quartile: 
6.22% p.a., median: 5.88% p.a., third quartile: 4.46% p.a. 
Source: KNUiE Monthly Bulletin 03/2003 and author’s calculations. 
  17Table 3. Pension funds vs. other investment vehicles. The investment results for the 
period 1 June 1999 – 31 March 2003 (discretely compounded rates of return, %). 
睨 ⁰ 睨潬攠 灥物潤 瀮 愮
健湳 渠 湤   ⁦湤猩 㔴⸹
⁡ 敲慧 ⁳ 牶 敤 ㄶ ⁦湤 ㄮ 㜲 ㈳⸳ ⸶
畩 瑹⁭慲 整 ㌮ ㈶ ⴸ⸵
㈶⸳ ⴴ〮 㔶
剒 ⴲ㘮 㤴 㐱⸰
湤⁭慲 整 䝏 偌 㔮 ㌰ ㌹⸲ ⸰
湤⁭畴 ⁦湤 畲潏 ㈮ 㘴 ㈷⸳ ⸵
扏 㔮 ㄰ ㌸⸳ ⸸
䈲 ㌮ ㌹ ㌰⸶ ⸲
慶 牡   䙕 ㌮ 㜳 ㌲⸰ ⸵
琠 瑩 〮 ㍗ ⼰⸷ ⁇ 偌 〮 㘲 ㄸ⸷ ⸵
扥湣桭 慲歳 㐲⸹ ⸷ 㔮 ㌱ ㌮ 㜹
䑓 㐱⸰ ⸳ ㌮ 㜸 ㌮ 㐲
䑓 ㌶⸷ ⸵ 〮 ㌰ ㈮ 㔹
瑵 ⁦ 猪 䕱畩 瑹 ⴱ⸱ ⴲ〮 ㈳
湣敤 ㈴⸰ ⸷ ⸰
潷瑨 㐱⸸ ⸵ 㐮 㐲 ㌮ 㔸
ㄲ⸳ 㔮 㤶 㘮 ㈱
湥 㐮 ㈹ 㜮 㤹 㠮 ㌴
浥 瑩 挠 慧攠 ⁦爠 慬⁦湤 ⁥ ⁤ 物 湧⁴攠 ⁩⁥ 捨⁣ 瑥杯
⁲ 晲 ⁲ ㄲ⁭ 湴桳⁔ 特⁂ ㄲ⸹ ⸲ 㠮 㤱
浥 湴⁦湤 牡 〮 㤴 ㈰⸱ ⸹
⁤ 瑳 ⨪ 啓 ㌮ 㠳 ㌮ 㐴 ⴸ⸱
‱ 潮瑨 㐴⸰ ⸹ 㘮 ㈱ 㐮 〰
偌丠ㄠ 〮 㘰 ㄸ⸷ ⸵
⨪ 敲慧 瑥献⁄ ⁩ 獴浥 湴⁩捬 畤敳⁥ 来⁲瑥⁡ 灲 捩
晬 ⁲瑥 ㌮ 㤵 㔮 㜶
慬 ⁲瑥猠潦⁲ 瑵牮 ⁲ 猠 潦牥瑵牮
 
Returns in %. Calculation period: 1 June 1999 – 31 March 2003. Monthly returns (p.a.) 
Description of abbreviations: WIG - Warsaw Stock Exchange Index, WIG20 - Warsaw Stock 
Exchange Top 20 Blue Chips Index, WIRR - Warsaw Parallel Stock Exchange (secondary 
stocks), GOPL - Merrill Lynch Polish Government Bond Index, EuroOblig, SkarOblig, SEB2 
- three biggest mutual funds investing in bonds, MFUNDS - the arithmetic average for the 
biggest mutual funds investing in bonds, Retirement funds - mutual funds with retirement 
profile (third pillar), USD - American dollar, PLN - Polish New Zloty, CPI - Consumer Price 
Index. Survived funds include those funds that were operating from 1 June 1999 and that 
are still in the market (31 March 2003). All survived funds includes above position plus 
  18late-coming funds that are still in the market (31 March 2003). That position is an 
arithmetic average of both groups. 
Source: Author's calculations based on Parkiet(www.parkiet.com.pl), Merrill Lynch Bank, 
National Bank of Poland (www.nbp.pl), Hoga (www.tfi.hoga.pl). 
  19Table 4 Composite performance measures for pension funds and other investment 
vehicles. 
  Sharpe    Treynor 
average of 4 mutual funds 
investing in bonds 
0.171  MFUNDS  0.711 
MFUNDS  0.151  average of 4 mutual funds 
investing in bonds 
0.705 
GOPL  0.114  GOPL  0.346 
RODZINA  0.038  RODZINA  0.067 
NN (Nationale Nederlanden)  0.031  SAMPO  0.034 
SAMPO  0.031  NN (Nationale Nederlanden)  0.031 
POLSAT  0.013   POLSAT  0.013 
CU (Commercial Union)  - 0.011  CU (Commercial Union)  - 0.011 
ALLIANZ  - 0.016  ZURICH  - 0.017 
ZURICH  - 0.017  ALLIANZ  - 0.019 
EGO  - 0.019  EGO  - 0.020 
PZU  - 0.019  PZU  - 0.020 
DOM  - 0.020  DOM  - 0.021 
BANKOWY  - 0.021  BANKOWY  - 0.023 
ERGO HESTIA (previously 
PBKORZEŁ) 
- 0.023  ERGO HESTIA (previously 
PBKORZEŁ) 
- 0.024 
13 survived funds (early 
starters) 





- 0.033  funds existing at the market 
(variable) 
- 0.025 
PIONEER  - 0.051  CREDIT SUISSE (previously 
WINTERTHUR) 
- 0.034 
PEKAO  - 0.062  all 16 survived funds  - 0.065 
all 16 survived funds  - 0.065  PEKAO  - 0.066 
funds existing at the 
market (variable) 
- 0.065  SKARBIEC  - 0.073 
SKARBIEC  - 0.067  POCZTYLION  - 0.077 
POCZT  - 0.075  PIONEER  - 0.078 
AIG  - 0.091  AIG  - 0.096 
3 survived funds (late 
starters) 
- 0.094  3 survived funds (late 
starters) 
- 0.100 
KREDYTBANK  - 0.148  WIG  - 0.158 
WIG  - 0.176  KREDYTBANK  - 0.158 
5 discontinued funds  - 0.176  WIG20  - 0.168 
WIG20  - 0.183  all funds  - 0.184 
ARKA  - 0.288  5 discontinued funds  - 0.233 
all funds  - 0.309  ARKA  - 0.348 
EPOKA  - 0.392  EPOKA  - 0.623 
   
Returns in %. Calculation period: 1 June 1999 – 31 March 2003. Calculations based on 
monthly differential returns (p.a.). The calculation period is shorter for those funds that 
started later or discontinued their activities.   
  20Description of abbreviations:  MFUNDS - is the arithmetic average of the three biggest 
mutual funds investing in bonds, WIG - Warsaw Stock Exchange Index, WIG20 - Warsaw 
Stock Exchange Index for 20 biggest blue chips, WIRR - Warsaw Stock Exchange for 
Secondary Market (smaller stocks), GOPL - Merrill Lynch Polish Government Bond Index, 
all funds - the arithmetic average of all 21 funds (calculation period is shorter), all 16 
survived funds - the arithmetic average of all funds that survived, 3 survived funds (late 
starters) - the arithmetic average of all funds that survived but did not start on 1 June 1999, 
5 discontinued funds - the arithmetic average of the funds that did not survived, funds 
existing at the market (variable) - the arithmetic average of the changing number of funds 
that existed during the calculation period. 
Source: Author's calculations. 
  21Table 5 Comparison of ranking persistency. 
  Sharpe  Treynor      Sharpe  Treynor 
A. all funds (21)    B. survived funds (16) 
AIG  18  18    ALLIANZ  5  6 
ALLIANZ*  6  7    KREDYTB  16  16 
ARKA**  20  20    PEKAO  12  12 
BANKOW  11  11    AIG  15  15 
CU  5  5    BANKOW  9  9 
DOM  10  10    CU  4  4 
EGO**  8  8    DOM  8  8 
EPOKA**  21  21    NN  1  2 
KREDYTB*  19  19    PBKORZEL  10  10 
NN  2  3    POCZT  14  14 
PBKORZEL  12  12    POLSAT  3  3 
PEKAO*  15  14    PZU  7  7 
PIONEER**  14  17    SAMPO_NU  2  1 
POCZT  17  16    SKARBIEC  13  13 
POLSAT  4  4    WINTERTH  11  11 
PZU  9  9    ZURICH  6  5 
RODZINA**  1  1         
SAMPO_NU  3  2         
SKARBIEC  16  15         
WINTERTH  13  13         
ZURICH  7  6         
Correlation ratio  0.990    Correlation ratio  0.994 
   
Bolded areas indicate different ranking values. Calculation period: 1 June 1999 – 31 March 
2003. The calculation period is shorter for those funds that started later or discontinued 
their activities. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
  22Table 6 Portfolio investments of pension funds (as of 31 March 2003). Polish zlotys 
(million PLN). 
Investment  m PLN  % 
National Investment Funds (privatization funds)  50.9  0.16% 
Equities  8,023.4  24.46% 
T-bills  1,089.1  3.32% 
Bank securities and deposits  1,343.6  4.10% 
Bonds  22,280.2  67.93% 
Others  12.2  0.04% 
Total  32,799.4  100.00% 
   
Source: KNUiE Monthly Bulletin 03/2003 and author’s calculations. 1 PLN = approx. 3.9 
USD (March 2003).
  23Table 7 Pension industry performance: Jensen’s alpha (annualized monthly returns). 
⁁⁓ 敤 湤猠ㄳ
䵯 莿 琭癡 汵 灶 獴
晡捴 潲
琭癡 汵 灶 扯
晡捴 潲
琭癡 汵 灶 刲
⠱⤠ 整⁭ 摥 ⁷瑨⁗ 〮〴〴 ㈮㐱 〮〲〠 〮㌰㤱 㤮㌴ 〮〰〠 ⴠ ⴠ ⴠ 〮㠴㤴
⠲⤠ 整⁭ 摥 ⁷瑨⁗ 〠 〮〴㌳ ㈮㠰 〮〰㠠 〮㈵㈲ ㄳ⸵㌠ 〮〰〠 ⴠ ⴠ ⴠ 〮㠸ㄵ
⠳⤠呷 摥砠 氠睩 䜠 〮〳㐳 ㈮㜰 〮〱〠 〮㌱ㄶ ㄶ⸰〠 〮〰〠 〮㈰㤵 ㈮㘵 〮〱 〮㠸㈴
⠴⤠呷 摥砠 氠睩 䜠 匠 〮〳〲 ㈮〱 〮〵ㄠ 〮㈹㐳 㤮㜷 〮〰〠 ㄮ〷〲 ㌮㈸ 〮〰 〮㠷㠶
⠵⤠呷 摥砠 氠睩 䜲〠䝏 〮〳㔴 ㈮㔹 〮〱㌠ 〮㈴〸 ㄶ⸸㠠 〮〰〠 〮㈶㔱 ㈮㔹 〮〱 〮㤰㜹
⠶⤠呷 摥砠 氠睩 䜲〠 匠 〮〳㈵ ㈮㔷 〮〱㐠 〮㈴〴 ㄶ⸵㔠 〮〰〠 ㄮㄵ㔷 㔮㈶ 〮〰 〮㤱㘰
Sample consists of 13 pension funds. The monthly returns from 1 June, 1999 till 31 March, 2003. 
 
偡 ⁂⁁氠 敤 湤猠 ⁩ 畤楮 朠污 ⵣ潭 敲猠
䵯 莿 琭癡 汵 灶 獴
晡捴 潲
琭癡 汵 灶 扯
晡捴 潲
琭癡 汵 灶 刲
⠱⤠ 整⁭ 摥 ⁷瑨⁗ 〮〳㔴 ㈮〳 〮〴㤠 〮㌰〶 㤮〰 〮〰〠 ⴠ ⴠ ⴠ 〮㠴㔵
⠲⤠ 整⁭ 摥 ⁷瑨⁗ 〠 〮〳㠵 ㈮㔱 〮〱㘠 〮㈴㘳 ㄳ⸷ㄠ 〮〰〠 ⴠ ⴠ ⴠ 〮㠸㔲
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Sample consists of the variable number of pension funds that existed at the market in that time (includes late-starters and discontinued 
funds). The monthly returns from 1 June, 1999 till 31 June, 2003. 
All regressions were estimated with the White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance technique. The averages are the 
arithmetic average performance of the all funds (equally weighted). 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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* Ego fund has recently ended its operations (43 observations available). 
Monthly gross continuously compounded rates of return used. Numbers in brackets 
represent White heteroskedasticity-consistent t-values. *, **, ***: represent estimates 
significant at 1, 5 and 10% significance level, respectively. Some of the models were 
estimated with an autoregressive error term (e.g. AR(1)) to correct the autocorrelation 
problem. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Approximate ranges of significant estimates. Correlation between rankings: real return vs. 
Sharpe ratio 0.82, real return vs. market share 0.39, Sharpe ratio vs. market share 0.22. 
Source:Author’s calculations. 
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Estimates significant at 10% significance level. Industry averages are the arithmetic 
averages. Calculation period: 1 June 1999 – 31 March 2003. Monthly continuously 
compounded annualized rates of return. “-“ represents no significant result. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Calculation period: 1 June 1999 – 31 March 2003. Monthly continuously compounded 
annualized rates of return were used. AR – autoregressive error term model. *, **, *** 
represent significant estimates at respectively 1, 5 and 10% significance levels. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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